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Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between environmental protection and international capi-
tal movements, when tax policy is endogenous (through voting). A two-period general equilibrium
model of a small open economy is specified to compare the effects of two different constitutions
(commitment or no commitment in tax policy), as well as income inequality. Under the commit-
ment regime, the equilibrium is characterised by a lower labour tax, higher environmental tax and
less capital locating abroad than in the no-commitment equilibrium. Furthermore, given the degree
of commitment, more equal societies are characterised by tougher environmental policy and less
capital locating abroad.
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1. Introduction
Policymakers often express concern that strict environmental protection will lead
to capital moving abroad with a consequent deterioration of international
competitiveness, a rise in unemployment and a slowdown of economic growth.
This view has been reflected in the recent political debate. For example, the
European carbon/energy tax proposal of the early 1990s included the exemption
of energy-intensive industries, in order to preserve their international
competitiveness. The proposal has not been implemented yet, one of the reason
being a likely loss in competitiveness of European countries. At the same time,
the debate concerning the implementation of the North-American-Free-Trade-
Agreement (NAFTA) focused at a large extent on the fear that US industries
would relocate in Mexico, where the environmental standards are more lax.
Economists have analysed the effects of environmental policy either on the
movements of capital across regions or on the location behaviour of firms (see
Jaffe et al., 1995, for a useful survey, and Wilson, 1996 for an overview).1 The
existing theoretical studies typically find a positive correlation between stringency
of domestic environmental policy and capital or industries relocating abroad. In
particular, a study of capital relocation and environmental concern in a small open
economy has been conducted by Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994). They find
that stronger preferences for the environment result in a reduction in output and
capital demand, which in turn causes capital moving abroad.2
In contrast, the majority of the existing empirical studies, almost
exclusively concerning the US, find that environmental policy typically is not
significant in explaining capital movements and firms’ migration. For a survey of
the existing empirical studies see Levinson (1996).3
This reveals that standard theoretical models of environmental policy and
capital movements may fail to capture some important aspects of the problem at
1 In this paper we do not focus on decisions about firms’ or plants’ location but we focus on
capital movements, that is whether individuals invest assets at home or abroad. In this respect our
paper is different from the literature on strategic environmental policy and plant location. The two
issues are however, often mentioned together in the policy debate. For the role of government
commitment on firms’ location decisions, see Ulph and Valentini (2002).
2 A few theoretical papers, however, do not support a positive correlation between stringency of
environmental protection and capital flight. See, in a tax competition framework, with redistributive
concerns, Oates and Schawb (1988) and Wilson (1996). In this paper we want to point out another
reason for a negative correlation, that is the effect of government commitment. This is why we
model a small open economy and abstract from the tax competition issue.
3 An exception is List and Co (2000) who find empirical evidence for the impact of environmental
policy on firms’location behaviour.
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hand. For example, the majority of the theoretical studies are set up in a static
framework, whereas dynamic considerations may play an important role. A
relevant issue is at which date the environmental policy is implemented with
respect to the household’s decisions on consumption and investment (which is not
an issue in a static framework). In a dynamic set up, whether the government can
or cannot commit to the environmental policy will make a considerable difference,
due to the time-inconsistency problem.4
Another feature of most of the existing studies is that only one policy
instrument, namely the environmental tax (or standard), is modelled. We think it
is important to incorporate a standard second-best framework, allowing for
distortionary taxes as well (see among others, Sandmo, 1975, and Bovenberg and
de Mooij, 1994). Furthermore, redistributive concerns from rich to poor
individuals may play an important role in the government’s decision about
environmental policy (see Oates and Schwab, 1988; Marsiliani and Renström,
2000a,b; Eriksson and Persson, 2003 and McAusland, 2003).
Moreover, observed policies are endogenous, and the decisions taken by
majority elected individuals. To our knowledge only two papers (Marsiliani and
Renström, 2000a,b) model environmental and fiscal policy through voting.5 In a
democratic system, individuals have the possibility of voting on representatives.
Whether the majority elected candidate represents the preferences of the poor or
rich part of the population, obviously influences the policy choice. In fact, if the
environment is a normal good, poorer individuals prefer a lower environmental tax
(see Marsiliani and Renström, 2000b).6
In this paper, we want to examine the relationship between the degree of
commitment in policy, environmental protection, and international capital
4 A government’s policy is dynamically inconsistent when, although being optimal at the outset,
it is not longer optimal at a later date even if no new information has appeared. This means that
the government has some incentive to change its plans (see the seminal paper by Kydland and
Prescott, 1977, and for an application to environmental policy, see Marsiliani and Renström,
2000a).
5 Eriksson and Persson (2003) and McAusland (2003) present models with voting over aggregate
pollution, but without taxation.
6 Baumol and Oates (1988) use indifference curve analysis to argue that a poorer individual
demands less of the environment, if the latter is a normal good. However, their argument only
holds in situations where individuals differ in endowments and face the same trade-off between
private consumption and the environment. In more general situations, where individuals differ in
factor ownership or productivities, individuals will no longer face the same trade-off, implying that
we can have situations where poorer individuals demand more of the environment, even if all
goods are normal. Nevertheless, as shown in Marsiliani and Renström (2000b), when looking at
environmental protection (as measured by a pollution tax), non-inferiority of all goods (including
the environment) makes a poorer individual to prefer less environmental protection.
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movements. Our main interest is how a different degree of commitment influences
environmental protection and location of capital, when both are endogenous. We
take the view that governments adopt the optimal policy given the constitution
(i.e. given commitment or no commitment),7 and we verify under which
circumstances higher environmental taxes go hand in hand with capital outflow,
when both are endogenous. Furthermore, rather than focusing on a government’s
incentive for changing one policy instrument (such as environmental policy) we
focus on the incentives related to a wider tax system. To our knowledge, apart
from Marsiliani and Renström (2000a), no other paper has analysed the
consequences of the time-inconsistency problem on environmental policy in a
second-best framework.
Our paper is related to the work of Klein, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2004).
They compare public goods provision under three constitutions: first best (the
government has access to a lump sum tax), second-best (the government has
access only to an income tax but can commit to all future taxes), and third-best
(the government has access only to an income tax and cannot commit to future
taxes). Our paper is different from Klein, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2004) in that we
use a small open economy model (Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1994a) and
introduce the second-best through heterogeneous individuals.8 Furthermore, our
focus is on environmental policy and capital movements, not public goods.
In analysing the consequences of commitment for environmental policy and
capital movements we need (at least) two periods (to capture intertemporal
decisions), and a second-best framework (to model distortionary taxation).9 We
introduce the second best by analysing an economy with heterogeneous
individuals, ruling out individual-specific lump-sum taxes. Finally, policy is
endogenised by letting individuals vote on representatives, and the majority-elected
representative implements her preferred policy. To capture the degree of capital
7 In practice we have in mind constitutional arrangements that cause a delay between policy
decision and policy implementation. This could be the length of the budgetary period, the time
delay between passing the budget in the legislature and when it is adopted, or the presence of a
second chamber of the legislature that has the power of delaying (but not rejecting) a policy
proposal (e.g. the House of Lords in England).
8 There are two ways of introducing the second best. Either by ruling out lump-sum taxes in a
representative agent model, or by introducing heterogeneous individuals and ruling out individual-
specific lump sum taxes (still allowing for a poll tax). We introduce it in the second way, while
Klein et. al. (2004) in the first.
9 The time-inconsistency problem is a feature of second-best analysis (it never arises in the first-
best). They may arise either in one-person economies if lump-sum taxes are ruled out, or in many-
person economies if individual-specific lump-sum taxation is impossible. In both cases the problem
arises if the elasticities of the tax bases are dependent on when the policy decision is taken.
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movements, we present an open economy where individuals own assets
domestically and abroad; the domestic assets are rented to firms. Consequently,
we take the difference between the stock of total assets and capital invested in
domestic production as measuring the capital being allocated abroad (or
alternatively the negative of foreign capital attracted).
Specifically, individuals differ in their learning abilities and this will make
them spend different amounts of time on learning, and thereby accumulate
different amounts of human capital, which in turn will give rise to wage
differentials. Firms are perfectly competitive and employ a CRS technology in
physical capital, human capital and emissions. We will consider a tax system
consisting of a linear labour tax and an environmental tax (a tax on firms’
emissions that generate pollution externalities). The tax receipts are used for
provision of a lump-sum transfer. Individuals vote on candidates and the majority
elected candidate implements her preferred fiscal policy. Throughout the paper we
refer to the second best when a government can commit to future tax policy, and
the third best when it cannot.
In our paper a time-inconsistency problem in labour taxation arises. When
the government can commit to a level of the future labour tax, it takes into
account that a higher level of the tax causes individuals to switch from labour to
study-time. If the government can reoptimise in the future, the individuals have
already invested in human capital and that stock is fixed. The individuals only
change their labour supply. The elasticity of the labour tax base is (expectedly)
smaller. Thus, labour is overtaxed in the third best (when the government takes
the tax decision after the individuals have chosen their investment in human
capital), because labour supply in efficiency units is less elastic.
We show that changing the constitution from discretion to commitment10
makes the optimal environmental tax greater and at the same time the economy
attracts foreign capital. Then, commitment in tax policies results to be a factor
which can explain a negative correlation between environmental protection and
capital being relocated abroad. The reason is that the efficiency gain in moving
to commitment increases the consumption possibilities of all goods, and if the
environment is a normal consumption good, the majority elected representative
tends to want to provide more of it, i.e. implementing a larger environmental
tax.11 At the same time, under commitment, less capital is allocated abroad. The
10 In practice we have in mind an increase in the length of the budget period, or introducing a
second chamber of the legislature with the power of delaying (but not rejecting) a policy proposal
(with the members of the second chamber not being elected at the same time or elected at all), like
the House of Lords in England.
11 In a static optimal tax setting, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994b) show that higher marginal
cost of public funds (i.e. a tighter second-best constraint) implies a lower environmental tax.
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reason is that the labour tax is smaller, and human capital investment larger. The
larger supply of human capital increases the productivity of physical capital and
therefore tends to retain physical capital at home.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the economy is introduced
and the assumptions are formalised, and in Section 3 the economic equilibrium is
solved. In Section 4 we characterise individuals’ preferences over policy, under
the various timing assumptions. In Section 5 we solve three politico-economic
equilibria: the first when elections take place in the second period and the majority
elected individual implements policy in the second period, the second when
elections take place in the first period, but the majority elected individual cannot
commit to future taxation, and the third when elections take place in the first
period and the majority elected individual can commit. Several questions are of
interest. Does a stricter environmental policy go hand in hand with capital locating
abroad, when redistributive concerns play a role? And under which constitutions?
What is the role of inequality (in terms of learning ability and consequently
income distribution) for the implementation of a stringent environmental policy?
And how does inequality relate to capital movements? Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. The Economy
We shall specify an economy which is rich enough to analyse the relationship
between environmental policy and capital movements and that formalises the time-
inconsistency problem, but simple enough to keep the analysis tractable.
Individuals have preferences over period-one consumption, c0i, period-one
time spent learning hi, period-two labour supply, li, period-two consumption, ci,
and period-two provision of clean environment, (-x), where x denotes pollution.
Individuals are indexed by i and characterised by their learning ability parameter
γi, which is distributed according to the distribution function Γ(i). The ability is
known to the individuals while the government only knows the distribution of
abilities (Mirrlees, 1971). The labour productivity of the individual in the second
period is her time spent learning in period one times her learning ability. Through
most of the paper we shall assume that the median (second-period) productivity
is not greater than the mean.12 Furthermore, we normalise the population size to
unity.
In the first period individual i (with ability γi) receives a lump-sum
endowment W0, which is used for period-one consumption, and savings in assets
12 This implies an assumption on the distribution of learning abilities, Γ. See further Section 3.
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ai. In the second period, before production takes place, these assets can be
invested both domestically (i.e. rented as physical capital to domestic firms, with
R the rental price of capital) and abroad (foreign investments.13 The difference
between total assets and productive capital denotes capital outflow. In the second
period, the individual supplies labour, and earns the pre-tax wage rate w, per unit
of efficient labour. The after-tax wage income plus a lump-sum transfer from the
government, T, and the returns on assets are used for consumption. The price of
consumption is normalised to unity. Pollution x is generated by production, which
takes place in period two. The government provides lump-sum transfers by taxing
labour income at rate τl, and pollution at rate τx.14 The after-tax wage is denoted
ω. In order to gain tractability, we assume specific functional forms. The next
section states these assumptions.
2.1. Assumptions
A1 Individuals’ Preferences
The utility function is assumed to be of the form
(1a)
where the second period utility is
(1b)
and where hi,li ≥ 0, ε>1, and the parameters β, and η are strictly positive. Leisure
has been normalised to 1 and x denotes aggregate pollution. Ψ′(x)>0, and Ψ′′(x)≥
0.
A2 Individuals’ Constraints
The individuals’ budget constraints are
13 Under perfect foresight, in equilibrium, nobody has an incentive to relocate their capital on the
international market, since the return on domestic investment will equal the return on the
international market.
14 We have not introduced capital taxes, but in Section 6 we discuss the likely consequences of
including capital taxation. For source based capital taxation our analysis remains unchanged (see
Section 6).
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where ω≡(1-τl)w is the after tax wage.
(2a)
(2b)
A3 Production
A large number of firms operate with a Cobb-Douglas technology in physical
capital, labour (in efficiency units) and pollution. Production yt, can therefore be
calculated as if there was a representative firm employing aggregate labour H,
physical capital k and emissions x
(3) where (4)
A4 Government’s Constraint
The tax receipts are fully used for lump-sum transfers
(5)
A5 Representative Democracy
The tax rates, τtl, τtx and, consequently, the spending decision are determined by
a majority elected representative, under either of three constitutions:
(a) elections are held in period 2, and the majority elected representative
chooses taxes before the choice on period-2 labour supply and consumption is
taken, and before the allocation of assets at home and abroad are made;
(b) elections are held in period 1, and the majority elected representative
chooses taxes in period 2, before the choice on period-2 labour supply and
consumption is taken, and before the allocation of assets at home and abroad are
made;
(c) elections are held in period 1, and the majority elected representative
chooses taxes before both period 1 and period 2 decisions are taken.
Cases (a), (b), and (c) are referred to as no commitment (third best), partial
commitment (third best), and full commitment (second best), respectively.
7
Marsiliani and Renström: Environmental Policy and Capital Movements
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
3. Economic Equilibrium
In this section, the individual and aggregate economic behaviour are solved for
given arbitrary tax rates and public expenditure. We solve the model recursively,
first the second period equilibrium, then the first. We focus on interior solutions.
3.1. Second Period Individual Economic Behaviour
Maximisation of (1b) subject to (2b), taking hi and ai as given, gives the
individuals’ labour supply
(6)
and indirect utility (up to an additive constant)
(7)
We notice that the higher the after-tax salary is, the higher is the labour supply.
Individuals with more human capital (larger hi) will supply more labour
(everything else being equal).
A direct property of the preferences in (1) is that all income effect is
removed from the labour supply and carried over to consumption. An increase in
lump-sum allowance therefore makes the individual consume more, without
changing the labour decision.
3.2. First Period Individual Economic Behaviour
Substituting (7) into (1a) and maximising subject to (2a) gives an individual’s
choice of the level of h and a as functions of the second period after-tax wage
rate, ω, and second-period productivity,
(8)
(9)
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We notice that there is a trade-off between time spent studying and investment in
assets: a higher rate of interest causes individuals to study less and to invest more
in assets. We also see that the higher the after-tax wage is, the longer is the time
spent learning.15 Also, what will matter for the individual’s attitude towards
redistribution is not the ability to learn, but the productivity in work in the second
period. The productivity in work is γihi, which is proportional to γi(1+ε)/(ε-1). This is
the key measure we will refer to in the rest of the paper.
3.3. Aggregate Economic Behaviour
The second- and first-period aggregate economic behaviour is generated by
aggregating the individuals’ quantities obtained in Sections 3.1 and 3.2
respectively. To obtain the aggregate labour supply (in efficiency units), defined
in (4), we integrate (8) over the population to get
where
(10)
(11) (12)
The difference between the second and first periods is that in the second period
individuals have invested in their human capital and assets and consequently h and
a are fixed, while viewed from the first period h and a are functions of the taxes.
γ˜ is the (1+ε)/(ε-1)th moment of the ability distribution, and is linearly related to
the average work productivity. Whether an individual earns a higher/lower wage
rate (per hour) than average depends whether the ratio γi(1+ε)/(ε-1)/γ˜ is greater/smaller
than unity.
3.4. Firm’s Behaviour
The representative firm chooses the pollution level so that the marginal product
15 If we are in the third best, so that the policy decision is not yet taken, the individuals make their
private choices on the basis of the expected policy outcome (i.e. the expected after tax wage ωe).
In equilibrium the actual policy outcome will coincide with the expected one ω=ωe.
9
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of pollution equals the tax rate, i.e. τx=Fx.16 The firm’s optimality condition with
respect to k (i.e. Fk=R) gives optimal k, and production, as functions of x and H
(13) (14)
where
(15) (16)
In the next section, we shall examine the policymakers’ preferences over fiscal
policy.
4. Preferences over Policy
Any individual elected into office will choose policy to maximise her own utility,
subject to the government budget constraint. We therefore need to characterise
how each type would choose policy. Policy will then be a function of the type in
office, and we can construct a voting equilibrium (in section 5) where individuals
vote over candidates.
First, it is more convenient optimising with respect to the after-tax wage,
ω, and the amount of the polluting factor, x, used, rather than with respect to the
tax rates themselves. In fact, in equations (6)-(11), (13)-(14) only ω and x appear.
We only need to rewrite the government’s budget constraint in terms of those
quantities. Equation (5) can be written as
The timing matters only to the extent that H (aggregate efficient supply of human
(17)
capital) responds differently to changes in the after-tax wage, depending on when
the tax decision is taken. In fact, the first-order conditions will take the same form
under the various assumptions about timing. This is due to the fact that the elected
individual chooses l i (and a i, hi if commitment) as well as policy, so the
derivatives of l i (and a i, hi if commitment) with respect to policy can be ignored
(by the Envelope condition). The problem of a hypothetical candidate is to
16 We will use this relation later in Section 4, to replace the pollution tax rate in the government’s
budget constraint. In the policy maker’s problem, we will optimise with respect to pollution, and
later on back out the implied pollution tax rate.
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(18)
subject to (17), (effects on l i, a i, and hi can be ignored by the Envelope
condition). The first-order conditions to (18) are
These conditions have to be evaluated under the different assumptions of timing.
(19)
(20)
First we clarify how they differ.
(a) No commitment
An individual, if elected in the second period, will take the decision upon
ω and x, taking as given the quantity of h˜. Optimal policy will be a
function of the identity of the candidate and h˜, which in turn is a function
of ωe (i.e. of expected ω).
(b) Partial commitment
An individual, if elected in the first period, will take the decision upon ω
and x, given the quantity of h˜. However, the choice of ω and x have to be
compatible with the expectations of ω in h˜. This is so because individuals
will observe who the elected candidate is already in the first period and
can form expectations of ω based on the identity of the candidate. Optimal
policy will be a function of the identity of the candidate only.
(c) Full commitment
An individual, if elected in the first period, will take the decision upon ω
and x, recognising the influence on h˜.
Since from the policymaker’s point of view h˜ is given under both partial and no
commitment, partial commitment can be treated as no commitment for time being.
Aggregate labour in efficiency units as a function of policy can be written
in one equation, with the parameters reinterpreted under the various timing
assumptions. Combining (10) and (11) we can write
where
(21)
11
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(22)
if commitment
if no commitment
(23)if commitment
if no commitment
Next, since all individuals have the same expectations (regardless timing) we can
write
(24) where (25)
Differentiating (17) with respect to ω, using (21), and inserting the derivative into
the first-order condition (19) gives
Using (24) and rearranging gives
(26)
where
(27)
Also, substituting (27) into (21) gives
(28)
Since w=(1-α-µ)A˜xθH-θ, and 1-τl=ω/w, equation (27) gives (also using (15))
(29)
as the labour tax rate preferred by individual i.
(30)
Recall that γˆi is the ratio of individual i’s labour productivity to the average
labour productivity. If γˆi is smaller than unity the individual earns less wage per
12
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hour worked than the average. Since ν takes on different values depending on the
timing, the same individual prefers a different tax rate under different timing
assumptions. In fact, since ν is larger under no commitment than under
commitment, the labour tax is larger under no commitment than under
commitment. The reason is that the tax base H is less elastic under no
commitment and thus would be over taxed. We also see that, given the timing, an
individual with greater learning ability prefers to tax labour less.
We will now make a complete characterisation of the choice of a
hypothetical individual in office. This will involve substituting for ωH, as a
function of the identity of the decision maker and of x (equation (28)), into (19)
and finding ∂x/∂γˆi. It turns out that ∂x/∂γˆi > 0 under all timing assumptions (see
the appendix). Since ∂mi/∂γˆi > 0, then by (28) ∂ω/∂γˆi > 0, so the decisions are
monotone in the decision maker’s learning ability.
Lemma 1 If one assumes A1-A5, and considers a hypothetical decision maker γˆ*,
then the decision maker’s choice will be functions of γˆ* with the following
properties
and for any given γˆ*
(31)
τl (no commitment) > τl (commitment).
Proof: See the appendix.
We will now turn to the characterisation of the various politico-economic
equilibria, and examine the consequences of time inconsistency on environmental
policy and capital movements.
5. Politico-Economic Equilibria
Regarding voting we have a one-dimensional choice space (the identity of the
decision maker). We now need to examine the individuals’ preferences over
candidates (potential decision makers). If preferences over candidates are single
peaked, then we know that the candidate preferred by the median individual in the
voting distribution cannot lose against any other candidate in a binary election.
Denote a hypothetical decision maker by superscript *. Substitute the policy
functions in Lemma 1 into individual i’s indirect utility, to obtain an indirect
utility in terms of γˆ*. This indirect utility has the following properties
13
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Lemma 2 If one assumes A1-A5, then individual i’s preferences over candidates’
γˆ* are single peaked, with the maximum attained
at γˆ*=γˆi if no commitment,
at γˆ*=(1+ε)/(2ε) + [(ε-1)/(2ε)]γˆi if partial commitment, and
at γˆ*=γˆi if full commitment.
Proof: See the appendix.
Lemma 3 If one assumes A1-A5, then the economic equilibrium under partial
commitment with policymaker γˆ* coincides with the economic equilibrium under
full commitment with policymaker γˆ*′ = (1+ε)/(2ε) + [(ε-1)/(2ε)] γˆ*.
Proof: Inserting γˆ*′ in equation (30), and evaluating under no commitment (ν=ε),
gives the same labour tax as when inserting γˆ* in equation (30) and evaluating
under full commitment (ν=(ε-1)/2). If the labour tax is the same in both equilibria,
then by equation (20), also the pollution level x is the same in both equilibria.
QED
Lemma 2 implies that we have a median-voter equilibrium, and that we can
completely characterise policy making given the underlying distribution of
abilities. The single peakedness follows from the monotonicity in the policy
variables with respect to the ability of the decision maker. Lemma 2 also implies
that when individuals vote in the first period, but the elected policymaker
implements policy in the second period, they will vote strategically on a
representative with a different (higher) ability than themselves.
Proposition 1 If one assumes A1-A5, then in politico-economic equilibrium, the
economic equilibrium under partial commitment (voting in period 1, policy
decision in period 2) coincides with the economic equilibrium under full
commitment (voting and policy decision in period 1), and the policymaker has a
higher ability in the partial commitment than in the full commitment equilibrium.
Proof: Follows from Lemma 1, 2, 3. QED
Proposition 1 implies that due to strategic voting, the period-one elected
representative will implement the same policy in period 2, as a period-one elected
representative would have implemented in period 1. Thus the partial-commitment
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equilibrium will coincide with the full-commitment equilibrium.17 Since the
partial commitment equilibrium coincides with the full commitment equilibrium
we will not distinguish between them two. We will henceforth only refer to
commitment versus no commitment.
Proposition 2 If one assumes A1-A5, then in politico-economic equilibrium the
following holds
where γˆ* is the median, and given any γˆ*
(32)
τl (no commitment) > τl (commitment).
Proof: Follows from Lemma 1-2. QED
We notice that the wage tax decreases in the productivity of the decisive
individual. This is a standard result, and is caused by the fact that a less
productive individual has more to gain from redistributive taxation.
Furthermore, labour is overtaxed when no commitment is possible (i.e. in
the third best). This is because once the individuals have invested in their human
capital, the elasticity of labour supply in efficiency units with respect to taxes is
less elastic (at that stage, it is too late to spend more time learning). When
commitment is possible, individual responses to changes in wages are greater. We
see also from (30) that the greater the difference between the median productivity
and the average, the greater is the difference between the commitment and the no
commitment solution. Thus, inequality (in the form of skewness of the
distribution) makes the time-inconsistency problem more severe.
Finally, pollution in absolute terms is increasing in the productivity of the
decisive individual. This is so because this individual wishes to tax labour less,
inducing individuals to accumulate more human capital, which in turn makes
pollution more productive.
Next, when we make all individuals identical we have the following result:
17 We do not expect this is a general property though, but is due to the assumptions regarding
utilities and technologies. Generally one should not expect all policy variables to exactly coincide.
When policy is one-dimensional, though, and the candidate space is rich (continuous), the full
commitment and partial commitment ought to coincide. This happens indeed in Persson and
Tabellini (1994).
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Corollary 1 If one assumes A1-A5, and that all individuals are identical, then
the commitment and no commitment equilibria coincide, and the environmental tax
is at the Pigovian level.
Proof: When all individuals are the same γˆ*=1, and the labour tax is zero
regardless of timing. Equation (20) then gives the Pigou rule (which is the same
regardless of timing).
QED
Thus, we verify that there is no time-inconsistency problem in the first best. This
is a general property, since the time-inconsistency problem is only a second-best
phenomenon. In the first best the wage tax is zero and any funding in addition to
the environmental tax receipts is obtained by lump-sum taxation, -T.
Furthermore, we get the following results
Proposition 3 If one assumes A1-A5, then total emissions, the after-tax wage,
and production are smaller under no commitment than under commitment, and for
a given level of commitment, the lower the ability of the decisive individual is, the
lower are emissions, the after-tax wage, and production.
Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 4 If one assumes A1-A5, then
(i) the pollution tax is smaller and the ratio between emissions and production is
greater under no commitment than under commitment,
(ii) given the level of commitment, the lower the ability of the decisive individual
is, the lower is the pollution tax, and the higher is the ratio of emissions to
production.
Proof: See the appendix.
Intuitively, under commitment the consumption possibilities are greater; if the
environment is a normal good (which is ensured by additive separability in (1b)),
the efficiency gains achieved in the second best (in comparison to the third best)
means more consumption of the environment. This is achieved by taxing pollution
more. Furthermore, if the labour tax is small, investment in human capital is large
and the marginal productivity of emissions is large too. Consequently, it is optimal
to increase emissions, but not to the extent that x/y increases.
We will next address the question of capital movements. Using the
decision rules for individuals’ savings as a function of the taxes we can state:
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Proposition 5 If one assumes A1-A5, then
(i) the politico-economic equilibrium under no commitment has larger capital
outflow than the politico-economic equilibrium under commitment,
(ii) given the level of commitment, the lower the ability of the decisive individual
is, the larger is the capital outflow.
Proof: Since the after-tax wage is greater under commitment (or under a
policymaker with higher ability), individuals invest less in physical assets (and
more in human capital), by equation (9). Since domestic firms’ capital demand is
proportional to production (equation (13)), and production is greater under
commitment (or under a policymaker with higher ability), domestic firms capital
demand is greater under commitment. Thus, the difference domestic savings -
domestic capital use, is less under commitment (or under a policymaker with
higher ability). QED
Intuitively, commitment on the one hand increases the returns on human capital,
which in turn reduces domestic savings, and on the other hand increases the
productivity of capital, overall attracting foreign capital.
Proposition 6 If one assumes A1-A5, then difference between the politico-
economic equilibria under commitment and under no commitment is larger the
lower the ability of the decisive individual is, at least as long as ε≤2.
Proof: See the appendix.
This shows that the time-inconsistency problem becomes more severe as one
tightens the second-best constraint, i.e. as the ability of the decisive individual
becomes smaller in relation to the average.
6. Summary and Conclusions
We have presented a general-equilibrium model of environmental taxation and
capital movements. The most important feature of this model is that it examines
the effects of different constitutions, that is whether the government can or cannot
commit to future tax policy.
When individuals differ in learning abilities a time-inconsistency problem
in labour taxation arises, implying that the commitment and no-commitment
equilibria do not coincide. The reason is that a majority-elected individual would
want to use the distortionary labour tax for redistribution. The optimal tax from
the viewpoint of the majority elected individual depends on the elasticity of the
tax base. The elasticity of the tax base depends on the timing of the policy
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decision. This is because individuals have the possibility of choosing the time they
spend on learning. They have to form expectations about the labour tax the
government is going to impose in the future. Once individuals have invested in
their human capital, the government is tempted to raise the labour tax in order to
redistribute from high earners to low earners. Individuals expecting this will invest
too little in human capital, and at the same time labour is overtaxed.
We have demonstrated that under commitment (second best), the labour tax
is smaller and the environmental tax is greater than under no commitment (third
best). Intuitively, there is a conflict between environmental and labour taxation
and lump-sum transfers. If the labour tax is small, the distortions caused by the
tax system will be small as well. In this case, the marginal utility of transfers is
lower and the median voter will prefer to protect the environment more (by paying
a higher environmental tax). Furthermore, under commitment, the increasing
returns on human capital reduces domestic savings and increases the productivity
of capital, which in turns attracts foreign capital or discourages domestic capital
locating abroad.
Everything else being equal, societies with more commitment in fiscal
policy would have a tougher environmental policy and less capital moving abroad.
In practice, commitment translates into the delay between policy decisions and
implementation. For example, countries with longer budget periods, or delays in
decision making (perhaps caused by having a policy proposal passing a second
chamber in the legislature), would have more commitment in policy. Since
countries differ in their constitutional arrangements, an empirical investigation not
accounting for constitutional differences would not necessarily find a relationship
between actual environmental policy and capital movements. Thus, this paper
provides us with a theoretical explanation for why no empirical evidence can
generally be found of a positive relationship between the stringency of
environmental policy and capital migration.
In addition, we have shown that the no-commitment equilibrium tax differs
more from the commitment equilibrium one, the larger the difference is in
learning ability between the decisive individual (median voter) and the average
individual. This suggests that the time-inconsistency problem becomes more severe
when the second-best constraint is tightened (i.e. when there is more inequality in
terms of mean-median distance). In this case, a poorer decisive individual will
prefer a higher labour tax and also have a greater marginal utility of private
consumption and lump-sum transfers, and therefore will be less willing to protect
the environment; at the same time capital productivity decreases and capital
migrates abroad. Viceversa, a more equal society, given the level of commitment,
would have tougher environmental policy and less capital outflow. Thus, through
the inequality channel we can also generate a negative correlation between
environmental policy and capital moving abroad. Future work should be devoted
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to empirically assessing this relationship.
In constructing our model we made a number of simplifying assumptions,
in particular: no capital taxes, no income effect on labour supply, and Cobb-
Douglas production technology. We will point out the likely consequences of
relaxing some of them.
We modelled an economy without capital taxes. If we had introduced
source-based capital taxes, as is usually done in the tax-competition literature, (i.e.
when the government taxes k), little would have changed in our model. Due to
mobility of capital (and the small-economy assumption), the after-tax domestic
interest rate must equal the foreign interest rate. The capital tax would have no
effect on the domestic individuals’ return on savings. The only effect the tax has
is on tax revenue. All individuals (regardless commitment regime) would agree on
maximising the tax revenue from capital taxation. The revenue maximising capital
tax rate equals 1-α. Inserting this into the government’s budget one obtains the
same equation (17) with A˜ redefined (multiplied by 1+α), leaving the remaining
analysis unchanged.
If we had introduced residence based capital taxation, then individuals
differing in their savings, a, would have different preferences over the capital tax.
Capital poorer individuals would prefer a higher capital tax. We suspect that
similar conclusions would remain in this case. Economies with more commitment
could afford stricter environmental policy. However, more commitment may mean
more savings, and therefore less reliance on foreign capital.
The utility function implied that there were no income effects on labour
supply. We expect that income effects would make the difference between the
commitment and no-commitment equilibria greater. To see this, we may think of
the extreme situation where the income effect is strong enough to exactly cancel
the substitution effect, making labour supply inelastic. Then, under no commitment
human capital can be confiscated. Individuals rationally expecting this would not
invest in human capital, just in physical. Under commitment confiscation is never
optimal. Thus, strong income effects may produce larger differences across the
commitment regimes.
We assumed a Cobb-Douglas production technology. For broader classes
of production technologies some results may weaken. A production technology
with less substitutability between human capital and pollution may give rise to a
situation where commitment yields more pollution. Commitment makes individuals
to invest more in human capital for the usual reasons. With low elasticity of
substitution, however, pollution’s marginal product may be large enough for the
median voter to accept a larger level of pollution (pollution is more productive).
19
Marsiliani and Renström: Environmental Policy and Capital Movements
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
First ∂τl/∂γˆi < 0 follows from equation (30). Next, we only need to prove that
∂x/∂γˆi > 0 under all assumptions on timing. This is so since ∂x/∂γˆi > 0 implies, (by
(29) in the full commitment and no-commitment cases, and by (50) (below) in the
partial commitment case), that ∂ω/∂γˆi > 0 (notice that by (28) ∂mi/∂γˆi > 0). Taking
the partial derivative of (17) w.r.t. x gives
which is the numerator in (20) (the second equality follows by (14)). Next, the
(33)
denominator in (20) may be written as follows (by using (6))
where the equality follows from (24). Then the first order condition (20) may be
(34)
written as
(35) where (36)
We treat Z as a function of γˆi and x: Z(γˆi, x). Denote the derivatives by subscripts.
We then find the sought derivative by differentiating (35)
We now need to find the derivatives of Z. First we will rewrite (36). Premultiply
(37)
(27) by H and use (14), then we have the following
Next,
(38)
where the first equality follows by using (14) in (17), the second equality by using
(39)
(38), and the third equality by using (28). Using the last equality of (39) in (36)
gives
(40)
20
Topics in Macroeconomics , Vol. 6 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 8
http://www.bepress.com/bejm/topics/vol6/iss3/art8
Sofar the analysis is valid under all assumptions on timing. We now need to
proceed differently, depending on which timing of events we assume. We begin
with the no-commitment case.
Under no commitment the last period’s learning and savings are taken as
given, and only the identity of the policy maker (as well as her choice) can vary.
Here we have ν=ε (by (23)), then Zn, where superscript n denotes no commitment,
(i.e. equation (40)) becomes
where the second equality follows by using (28), and the third by using (38). Use
(41)
(21), (29), and (38) to substitute for F˜, then we have
Take the derivatives with respect to x and γˆi, to obtain18
(42)
Substituting (43) and (44) in (37) gives ∂x/∂γˆi > 0 under no commitment.
(43)
(44)
Under partial commitment ωe in h˜ and σ changes as γˆi changes. When γˆi
is known also ωe will be known (and coincides with ω). This has to be taken into
account in differentiating Z. Under full commitment ωe is under the control of the
policymaker. The two cases can be captured simultaneously. In both cases ai will
respond to changes in the identity of the decision maker. Combining (8), (6) and
(24), and substituting into (9) gives
No expectations on ω is needed because the decision maker will be known in
(45)
advance.
18 N.B. under no commitment ai is invariant with respect to policy, and varies only with respect
to identity i. The derivative (44) is negative since ∂ai/∂γi < 0, which follows from (9).
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Substituting (45) into (36) gives
where superscript c,p denote commitment, partial commitment, respectively.
(46)
Substituting for T according to the second equality in (39), and for F˜ according
to (38) gives
or rearranged
(47)
Full commitment implies ν=(ε-1)/2, then using (28) in (48) we obtain
(48)
where mi/(ωH) has been substituted for by using (29).
(49)
Partial commitment implies that ωe in (22) has to be replaced by ω. Setting
ωe=ω in (22) and substituting into (29) gives (wherever ν appears it equals ε
according to (23))
where σ0 = γ˜(Rη2)-1/(ε-1). Set ωe=ω in (22) and substitute into (21), premultiply both
(50)
sides by ω, and substitute for ω on the right-hand side by using (50) to obtain
(N.B. ν=ε)
In (48), using (28) to eliminate mi where it first appears and (51) to eliminate
(51)
mi/(ωH) we have
(52)
We are now ready to take the derivatives of (49) and (52), respectively.
Differentiating Zc (i.e. (49)) with respect to x and γˆi gives
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(53)
The inequality in (54) follows since Zc is declining in mi, and mi is increasing in
(54)
γˆi. Then (37) implies that ∂x/∂γˆi > 0 holds here as well.
Finally differentiating Zp (i.e. (52)) with respect to x and γˆi gives
(55)
(56)
where η=(ε-1)/2. Then (37) gives ∂x/∂γˆi > 0. QED
Proof of Lemma 2
All three commitment regimes can be handled in the same proof. By (17), the
transfer is a function of ω, x, and H(ω), i.e. T=T(ω, x, H(ω)). Taking the
derivative of individual i’s indirect utility function with respect to γˆ* gives
(57)
The first term is the individual’s first-order variation with respect to ω times the
change in ω when γˆ* changes. The second term is the first-order variation with
respect to x times the change in x when γˆ* changes. With no commitment, and
with full commitment, these first-order variations are those that the individual
would face if she was to choose policy [equations (19) and (20)]. The peak is
reached at γˆi=γˆ*. If γˆ* < (>) γˆi the first-order variation is positive (negative) due to
the monotonicity of ω and x in γˆ*. With partial commitment, the first order
variations will not be zero when evaluated at γˆi=γˆ*. The reason is that the
candidate is chosen in period 1, and consequently the identity of the candidate
would reveal the policy to be chosen in period 2. To see this more clearly let
ωc(γˆ*), xc(γˆ*), Hc(ω), and ωn(γˆ*), xn(γˆ*), Hn(ω), be the functions under commitment
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and no commitment, respectively. Under commitment the derivatives of T(ωc(γˆ*),
xc(γˆ*), Hc(ωc(γˆ*))) with respect to ω and x are what a period-one policy maker
would face. Similarly, under no commitment the derivatives of T(ωn(γˆ*), xn(γˆ*),
Hn(ωn(γˆ*))) are what a period-two policy maker would face. However, whith partial
commitment the policy functions are the no-commitment policy functions, while
the human-capital supply function is the supply function under commitment
(evaluated at the no-commitment policy function): T(ωn(γˆ*), xn(γˆ*), Hc(ωn(γˆ*))). By
choosing the γˆ of the policy maker in period one in such a way that ωn(γˆ*′) =
ωc(γˆi), the first-order variations under partial commitment evaluated at γˆ*′ are zero.
This is the case when γˆ*′=(1+ε)/(2ε) + [(ε-1)/(2ε)]γˆi (follows from (30) and (23)).
Thus, under partial commitment the peak is reached at γˆ*′, and, as above, single
peakedness follows from the monotonicity of ω and x in γˆ*. QED
Proof of Propositions 3-4
In the no-commitment case, individuals will predict ωe accurately. To characterise
the equilibrium, ωe has to be substituted by ω in equation (22). This will result in
equation (29), with ν=(ε-1)/2 in the exponents, but with mi evaluated at ν=ε (see
equation (50)). Then, in equation (29) the only difference between the no-
commitment and the commitment equilibria is that the former is evaluated at
mi ν=ε, and the latter at mi ν=(ε-1)/2. Consequently, in comparing the two equilibria
we use equation (51) and perform comparative statics with respect to mi. First, by
using (35),
since ∂Z/∂mi < 0. Since mi ν=ε < mi ν=(ε-1)/2, mi is greater under commitment, and
(58)
consequently x is greater under commitment.
Next, since the pollution tax is
we need to evaluate the ratio H/x.
(59)
First, using (29),
(60)
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Next, use (58) to obtain (N.B. ν=(ε-1)/2)
Therefore, ∂(H/x)/∂mi > 0, and H/x is greater under commitment, implying that τx
(61)
is greater under commitment. Finally since production is A˜xθH1-θ = A˜x(H/x)1-θ, the
result on production follows. The result on the after-tax wage follows from (29).
The results regarding the identity of the policymaker go through, since mi is
greater under a policymaker with higher ability.
QED
Proof of Proposition 6
As in the proof of Propositions 3-4, the only difference between the no-
commitment and the commitment equilibria is that the former is evaluated at
mi ν=ε, and the latter at mi ν=(ε-1)/2. The distance between the two equilibria is
therefore
(62)
This distance is larger the smaller γˆi is, at least as long as ε≤2. QED
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